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Restitution of Benefits Conferred 
Under Minors’ Contracts
JOHN D. McCAMUS*
This article gives an account of the law relating to restitutionary 
recovery fo r  benefits conferred by parties to agreements which are 
unenforceable as a result o f the minority of one of the parties. It is 
argued that the case law offers rules which are inconsistent and 
unsatisfactory in policy terms but that a sound judicial restatement of 
them utilizing themes developed in the Canadian cases is both possible 
and desirable.
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to protect persons below the age o f majority1 from the 
harsh consequences of being compelled to perform what may have been a 
rash and improvident undertaking, the courts of common law developed 
a complex cluster of rules which permit minors to refuse to perform 
certain categories of agreements.2 The rules which establish whether or 
not a particular undertaking is binding attempt to balance the objective 
o f releasing minors from potentially oppressive bargains against a num ber 
of competing interests. First, there is a general public interest served by 
rules which foster the stability of transactions. This interest will 
obviously be felt most keenly by the other party to the transaction and 
by third party creditors or subpurchasers who may be detrimentally 
affected by the holding o f unenforceability. Secondly, minors them ­
selves may have an interest in being able to give an undertaking which 
is enforceable at law. T he common law has responded to the task of 
reconciling these interests by developing a num ber of different categories 
of transactions to which are attributed various degrees of enforceability. 
These categories are briefly described in the next section of this paper as
♦M.A., 1965, LL.B., 1968 (Toronto), LL.M., 1969 (London). Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University.
'T he -age o f majority at common law is 21. In Canada, the age o f majority has been reduced by 
statute. In six provincial jurisdictions — Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec 
and Saskatchewan — it is now 18 years of age. See S.A. 1971, c.L , s .l; S.M. 1970, c.91, s.l; 
S.O. 1971, c.98, s.l; R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c.A-3, s .l; S.Q. 1971, c.85, s.3; S.S. 1972, c .l., s.2. In the other 
provinces and in the territorial jurisdictions it is now 19 vears o f age. See S.B.C. 1970, c .l , s.l; 
R.S.N.B. 1973, c.A-4, s .l; S.Nfld. 1971 c.71, s.6; S.N.S. 1970-71, c.10, s.2; R.O.Y.N.W.T. 1974, 
c.A-1, s.2; O.Y.T. 1972, c .l, s.3.
’Apart from the standard works on contract, see, generally, D. R. Percy, The Present Law of Infants' 
Contracts (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 1.
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a necessary preliminary to the topic at hand, restitution o f benefits 
conferred under agreements which are unenforceable by reason o f the 
minority o f one of the parties.
This paper considers in some detail the law relating to the 
restitutionary problems which arise once it has been established that the 
agreement which the minor has entered into is an unenforceable one. If  the 
minor has already conferred benefits on the other party to the agreement, 
may he recover their value in a restitutionary claim? If the other party 
has conferred benefits upon the minor, may he recover their value? 
Or, alternatively, should the minor be required to make restitution o f the 
value o f benefits which he has received as a condition of being permitted 
to invoke the rule which renders the agreement unenforceable? As will 
be seen, the rules relating to these questions are also complex, indeed, 
perhaps more so than the enforceability rules.
As a prelude to an examination o f the restitutionary case law, it is 
useful to consider the nature of the competing interests which arise in 
this context and to suggest a framework of analysis with which the cases 
might be approached. In the first place, it is obvious that the party who 
has, at his own expense, conferred a benefit on the other party has an 
interest in recovering its value. The benefit was conferred in the course of 
performing an apparent contractual duty and was thus clearly not 
intended as a gift. As a general matter, this interest is one which has 
received strong recognition in the common law. Parties to unenforceable 
agreements are generally entitled to recover the value o f benefits con­
ferred on the other party in performance of what were thought to be 
binding contractual obligations.3 The body of law which establishes this 
proposition is now commonly regarded as constituting a major source of the 
modern law of restitution.4 In Canada the underlying rationale for these 
rules is expressed in the general principle o f unjust enrichm ent.5
There is evident merit in permitting at least some recovery premised 
on the unjust enrichment rationale in the context of minors’ agreements. 
Certainly, so far as benefits conferred by the m inor upon the adult party 
are concerned, it is difficult to conceive of an argum ent against granting 
the m inor a restitutionary award for the value o f the benefit conferred. 
There may also, in certain cases, be much to be said in support o f a 
restitutionary claim brought by the adult party. A convincing case can be
’See generally R. GofT and G. Jones, The Law o f Restitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966), 
at 16-25. And see, J. D. Me Camus. Restitutionary Remedies in Special Lectures of the Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 1975, at 255-299.
*lbtd.
’The leading Canadian authority adopting the unjust enrichm ent principle and rejecting the 
“implied contract" rationale is Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. and Constantmeau, [1954] S.C.R. 725; 
[1954] 3 D.L.R. 785 (contract unenforceable for want o f formality, recovery allowed for value of 
benefit conferred). And see, American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law af Restitution (1937), s. I 
(“A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense o f another is required to make restitution 
to the other.’’).
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made on policy grounds for the recovery of the value of necessaries 
supplied to the minor.6 Were the rule otherwise, minors might have 
difficulty obtaining necessaries on a credit basis. The argum ent in favour 
of a general right of recovery for benefits conferred on the minor is more 
tenuous. In support, it might be argued that a rule which uniformly 
denied a right o f restitutionary recovery to adults who have dealt in good 
faith might encourage irresponsible and exploitative conduct on the part 
of minors. On the other hand, relentless pursuit of the restitutionary 
interests of the supplier in this context could have the effect of under­
mining the objectives underlying the rules which render the agreement 
unenforceable. A rule which invariably permitted the adult party to recover 
the value of benefits conferred might have the effect of rewarding sharp 
practice of a kind which the unenforceability rule is designed to dis­
courage. Further, there may be situations in which the imposition on 
the minor of a duty to make restitution may subvert the policy o f per­
mitting minors to resile from unwise bargains. For example, in cases 
where the benefit conferred has been consumed or wasted, the imposition 
of a restitutionary duty to pay for its reasonable value may be as offensive 
to the underlying policy as would direct enforcement of the bargain.
In sum, there are strong arguments to be made in favour of recovery 
on unjust enrichment grounds where the minor has conferred a benefit on 
the other party to the unenforceable agreement. Further, an adult party 
who has supplied necessaries should be entitled to relief. More generally, 
one who has dealt in good faith with the minor should also be entitled 
to recovery subject to the proviso that such relief ought not be awarded 
where to do so would subvert the policy of affording special protection 
to young and inexperienced bargainers.
For reasons considered further below, the case law, particularly 
the English case law, has not developed a pattern which conforms closely 
to this model. Although some measure of restitutionary relief is accorded 
to both parties under the English rules, an examination o f the nature of 
such relief and the circumstances in which it has been granted does not 
reveal a consistent approach to the problem of resolving the competing 
interests articulated above. Indeed, it appears to be generally agreed 
that the English law is unsatisfactory. In 1967, the Latey Committee Report 
recommended statutory reform which would extend restitutionary 
recovery, as a general rule, to both parties.7
*See, mfra, the text at footnotes 32 to 45.
’See, Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority (1967), Cmnd. 3342 (hereinafter, the Latey Report) 
secs. 309-319. Although the Ontario Law Reform Commission in its 1969 Report on the Age of 
Majority and Related Matters, 53 et seq., indicates some hesitation with respect to the imposition of 
restitutionary duties on the minor (subject to a judicial discretion to relieve), the general thrust of 
this aspect o f the Latey proposals has gained acceptance elsewhere. See, e.g., Alberta Institute of 
Law Research and Reform, Report No. 14, Minors' Contracts (1975), 29-33; l-aw Reform Commission 
of British Columbia. Report on Minors' Contracts (1976), 28-32; the New Zealand Minors’ Contracts 
Act, S.N.Z. 1969, No. 41; the New South Wales Minors (Property and Contracts) Act, S.N.S.W. 1970, 
No. 60. For a thorough treatment o f the latter, see D. J. Hartland, The Law of Minors in Relation 
to Contracts and Property (Sydney: Butterworths, 1974).
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It is argued below, however, that a close reading of the Canadian 
case law suggests that considerable progress has been made by Canadian 
courts in developing restitutionary rules which are less random in their 
application and which, in their substance, approach more closely the 
analytical framework which has been proposed here.
B. THE RULES RELATING TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 
MINORS’ CONTRACTS
The general rule at common law is that minors’ agreements do not 
bind the infant party unless the agreement has been ratified by the infant 
after reaching the age o f majority.8 Minors’ contracts are thus voidable 
in the rather unusual sense that they cannot be enforced against one of 
the parties unless a ratification occurs.
There are a num ber of exceptions to this general rule. First, since 
a complete immunity from contractual liability might be more of a 
hindrance than a help to a self-supporting infant who must deal with 
others, some types of agreements have been recognized as binding at 
common law. This is the case with beneficial contracts of service and 
apprenticeship. In some provinces, the enforceability of such agreements 
has been made the subject of legislation.9 It is also established that the 
infant is liable for the reasonable value of goods and services supplied which 
are “necessaries” in the requisite sense, though it is unclear whether this 
liability is grounded in contract or restitution, a question considered 
further below. Another general category of exceptional cases consists 
of agreements by which the infant acquires an interest in a subject- 
m atter of a perm anent nature which carries with it continuing or recurrent
'See R. v. Rash (1923), 53 O.L.R. 245 (C.A.), at 257. et seq., per Rose J. And see, generally, 
Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 12 et seq.
That the ratification must be evidenced in writing is a requirement introduced in England by 
Lord Tenterden’s Act (1828), 9 Geo. IV, c.14, s.5. It has been adopted in some Canadian jurisdictions — 
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Prince Edward Island — by statute. See R.S.N.B. 1973, 
c.S-14, s.5; R.S.N.S. 1967, c.290, s.8; R.S.O. 1970, c.444, s.7; R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c.S-6, s.l. In others — 
Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan — its effect derives from the reception o f English law. See 
Moiyneux v. TratU (1915), 32 W.L.R. 292; 9 W.W.R. 137 (Sask. D.C.). In England and British 
Columbia, legislation rendering such ratifications unenforceable has been enacted. See the Infants 
Reltef Act (1874), 37 & 38 Viet., c.62, s.2 and the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.193, s.3.
'F o r typical provisions, see e.g., the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.193, s.4, and The Child Welfare 
Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C-80, s. 105 (contracts o f service). See further, e.g., the Apprenticeship and 
Tradesmen's Qualification Act, R.S.B.C. I960, c.13, s.16 and The Apprenticeship and Tradesmen's Qualifica­
tion Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.24, ss. 13,14 and 15.
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obligations.10 Agreements to purchase land,11 conveyances,12 mortgages,13 
and leases o f land,14 as well as agreements to purchase shares,15 
partnership agreem ents,16 and marriage settlements17 are included in this 
category and are said to be voidable in the more orthodox sense of 
being valid and binding until repudiated by the infant, either before 
attaining majority or within a reasonable time thereafter.18 Again, the 
enforceability of these types of agreements has been the subject of 
legislation in some jurisdictions.19
Such were the exceptions to the general rule developed by the English 
courts. To some extent, they may be seen as reflecting a concern to 
prevent undue hardship to an adult dealing with an infant in good faith. 
One further Canadian development must be noted, however, in which the 
primacy of the interests of the infant has been asserted. Canadian courts 
have recognized an additional category of exceptional cases consisting of 
contracts which are “necessarily to the prejudice o f the infant”. Such
l#See, generally, Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 15 et seq.
" Whittingham v. Murdy (1889), 60 L.T. 956 (Q.B.D.); Thurslan v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building
Society [1902] I Ch. 1. 71 L.J. Ch. 83 (C.A.), afTd [1903] A.C. 6. 72 L.J. Ch. 134 (H.L.). And see,
generally, V. Di Castri, The Law of Vendor and Purchaser (2nd e<L), at 64 et seq.
ltFoley v. Canada Permanent Loan and Savings Co. (1883), 4 O.R. 38 (D.C.); Whalls v. Learn (1888),
15 O.R. 481 (D.C.); McDonald v. Restigouche Salmon Club (1896), 33 N.B.R. 472 (C.A.); Lauwn v. 
Menard (1923), 25 O.W.N. 387 (H.C.).
Foley v. Canada Permanent Loan and Savings Co., ibid.
'*Davies v. Beynon-Harris (1931), 47 T.L.R. 424 (K.B.) (infant lessee); Slator v. Trmble (1961), 
14 Ir. C.L.R. 342 (infant lessor).
>lNorth Western Railway Co. v. McMichael (1850), 5 Ex. 114, 155 E.R. 49; Sovereign Bank of Canada, 
Clark's Case (1916), 27 D.L.R. 253 (Ont. C.A.); Re Central Bank and Hogg (1890), 19 O.R. 7 (D.C.); 
In the Matter of Prudential Life Insurance Co.: Re Paterson, [1918] 1 W.W.R. 105 (Man. S.C.).
“ The infant is not, however, liable during infancy for the debts o f the firm. See Goode v. 
Harrison (1821), 5 B. & Aid. 147, 106 E.R. 1147; Lovell & Christmas v. Beauchamp, [1894] 
A.C. 607, 63 L.J. Q.B. 802 (H.L.). And see Woods v. Woods (1885), 3 Man. L.R. 33 (Q.B.).
>7Duncan v. Dixon (1890), 44 Ch. D. 211; 59 L.J. Ch. 437; Edwards and Isaacs v. Carter, [1893] 
A.C. 360, 63 L.J. Ch. 100 (H.L.).
l*E.g„ Edwards and Isaacs v. Carter, ibid.; Murray v. Dean (1926), 30 O.W.N. 271 (H.C.); Hilliard v. 
Dillon, [1955] O.W.N. 621 (H.C.). Though the right to repudiate and set aside the conveyance may 
be lost where the minor has induced it by fraudulently misrepresenting his age: Wilbur v. Jones (1881),
21 N.B.R. 4 (C.A.); Gregson v. Law and Barry (1913), 15 D.L.R. 514, 5 W.W.R. 1017 (B.C.S.C.). 
Sed quaere. A preferable explanation for the results in these cases is that third party rights had 
intervened in that the property had been resold in each case to a bona fide purchaser.
'•With regard to land transactions, see e.g., The Infants Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 185, ss.2-8; the Settled 
Estates Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.351, ss.3, 20 el seq; The Child Welfare Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C-80, 
ss.l 17-121; The Infants Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.222, ss.4-10; The Infants Act, R.S.S. 1965, c.342, ss.9-19. 
With regard to marriage settlements see, e.g.. The Infants Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.185, ss.l 1-13, and 
The Infants Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.222, ss.l3-15.
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agreements are void, and hence, cannot be ratified.20 Although this 
further refinement of an already complex area o f the law has been 
criticized,2’ it appears to provide, albeit inelegantly, solutions for two quite 
distinct problems posed by the existing case law. First, the rules relating 
to repudiation may have the effect of binding an infant to a contract 
which is harsh and prejudicial if he sleeps on his rights after reaching 
majority. This cannot happen where the agreement is held void.22 
Similarly, an apparent ratification will be ineffective.23 Second, some of 
the difficulties present in the restitutionary rules under which the infant 
may attempt to recover the value of benefits conferred under the agreement 
may be ameliorated where the agreement has been held to be void at 
common law.24 However, this additional category may operate as a mixed 
blessing for the infant, by preventing enforcement of the agreement in 
cases where its advantages are not outweighed, in the opinion of the 
infant at least, by its disadvantages.25
The common law rules relating to the enforceability of minors’ 
contracts were substantially modified in England by the Infants Relief
2tBeam v. Beatty (No. 2) (1902), 4 O.L.R. 554 (C.A.); Phillips v. Greater Ottawa Development Co. 
(1916), 38 O.L.R. 315 (C.A.); Pyett v. Lampman (1922), 53 O.L.R 149, (1923] I D.L.R. 249 (C.A.); 
R. v. Rash, supra, footnote 8; McKay v. McKinley, [1933] O.W.N. 392 (H.C.); Ivan v. Hartley, 
[1945] 4 D.L.R. 142 (Ont. H.C.); Butterfield v. Sibbit and Nipissmg Electnc Supply Company Limited, 
[1950] O.R. 504 (H.C.); Re Staruch, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 807 (Ont. H.C.); AUobeUt v. Wilson, [19571 
O.W.N. 207 (C.A.); Upper v. Lightning Fastener Employees' Credit Union (St. Catharines) Limited (1967),
9 C.B.R. (N.S.) 211 (Ont.). And see R. v. Leduc (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 422 (Ont.). English authorities 
supporting the existence o f this category may be cited: see, e.g., Baylis v. Dtnelen (1815K 3 M.&S. 
477, 105 E.R. 689, and VtdUi v. O’Hagan, [1900] 2 Ch. 87. 69 L.J. Ch. 507 (C.A.). But see infra, 
footnote 21.
*' Pollock, for example, argued that the view that some infants’ contracts are void is contrary to 
the weight o f modern authority and criticized the distinction between void and voidable contracts 
as unreasonable. See Pollock’s Principles of the Law of Contracts, (13th ed.), at 47-48. And see, 
C. A. Wright, Note (1935), 13 Can. B. Rev. 319, at 323 where it is argued that this further category 
is both undesirable and unnecessary for the protection of the interests o f the minor. Pollock’s 
view appears to have prevailed in England. Thus, m odem  English treatises on the law of contract 
do not consider a separate category o f “void” contracts. In Chitty on Contracts (23rd ed.), vol. 1, 
at 184, note 12, it is suggested that in the earlier cases, “where the word ‘void’ was used ‘voidable’ 
was intended." T he void contract doctrine has been abandoned by American courts as well. 
See, e.g., WiUiston on Contracts (3rd ed.), vol. 2, s.227. The category o f voidness would create perils 
for innocent third parties if, as may be the case, no property passes under a void agreement. 
See McBride v. Appleton [1946] O.R. 17, [1946] 2 D.L.R. 16 (C.A.), per Roach, J.A. For this reason, 
among others, the better view is that property does pass. See Stocks v. Wilson, [1913] 2 K.B. 235, 
82 L.J K.B. 598; Watts v. Seymour, [1967] 2 Q.B. 647, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 1072, [1967] 1 All E.R. 1044 
(C.A.). And see G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (4th ed.) at 384. And see further, the text at 
footnote 116 et seq.
liBeam v. Beatty (No. 2); Phillips v. Greater Ottawa Development Co.; Re Staruch; McKay v. McKinley,
supra, footnote 20.
ilBeam v. Beatty (No. 2); Phillips v. Greater Ottawa Development Co.; McKay v. McKinley, supra, footnote 20.
“ For discussions of these problems, see infra, the text at footnotes 70 to 73.
*Mf the agreement is void, the adult party need not perform his obligations even though the infant
affirms the contract after attaining majority. The adult party may thus be afforded an unmeritorious
excuse for non-performance never contemplated at the time of formation. See Wright, supra,
footnote 21, at 324.
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Act, 1874.26 The pertinent provisions o f that statute were adopted in 
only one Canadian jurisdiction, British Columbia. Section 2 of the 
British Columbia Infants Act27 provides:
All contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, entered into by 
infants for the repayment o f  money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied 
or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries), and all accounts 
stated with infants, are absolutely void; but this enactment shall not invalidate 
any contract into which an infant may, by any existing or future Statute, 
or by the rules o f  common law or equity, enter, except such as now by law 
are voidable.
The Act goes on to provide, as does the English legislation, that no action 
shall be brought to enforce “. . . any promise made after full age to pay any 
debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full 
age of any promise or contract made during infancy. . . .”28 Although 
the precise effect of this legislation is a matter of considerable dispute,29 
it is clear that certain types o f contracts are rendered “absolutely void”30 
by the statute, and, further, that contracts considered voidable at 
common law, in the sense of not binding the infant until ratification, 
no longer bind the infant upon ratification.
In sum, a complex set of rules determines the question of the enforce­
ability of agreements entered into with minors. To ascertain which of 
those rules will apply in a specific case, the transaction must be charac­
terized as belonging to one of the following categories:
(a) agreements of service which are beneficial to the infant 
employee, which agreements are binding on both parties;
(b) agreements for the supply of necessaries to the minor;
(c) “voidable” agreements which are binding on both parties 
until repudiated;
(d) “voidable” agreements which are not binding on the minor 
unless ratified after attaining majority;
(e) agreements which are “void” at common law; and
*•37 & 38 Viet., c.62.
"R.S.B.C. 1960, c.193.
"Ibid., s.3.
‘•See, e.g. G. H. Treitel, The Infants Relief Act, 1874 (1957), 73 L.Q. Rev. 194; P. S. Atiyah, The 
Infants Relief Act, 1874 — A Reply, (1958), 74 L.Q. Rev. 97; G. H. Treitel, The Infants Relief Act, 1874 — A 
Short Rebutter, (1958), 74 L.Q. Rev. 104.
**The consequences of absolute voidness are, however, obscure. As to whether property passes, see 
infra, the text at footnote 116 et seq. As to the ability of third parties to rely on the voidness, see the 
conflicting authorities on the question o f the liability o f a guarantor o f a void indebtedness o f a minor; 
Coutts & Co. v. Browne-Lecky, [1947] K.B. 104, [1946] 2 All E.R. 207 (guarantor not liable); First 
Charter Financial Corporation Ud. v. Muse low (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 138 (B.C.S.C.) (dictum, guarantor 
liable). As to the ability o f the m inor to enforce void agreements, see the Treitel-Atiyah debate, 
ibid As to the availability o f restitutionary remedies, see further, infra, the text at footnotes 73 to 77 
and 112 to 144.
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(f) in British Columbia, agreements which are “absolutely void” 
within the meaning of tne Infants Act.
The task of classification is not an easy matter. The boundaries o f each 
category are elusive, as indeed, in some cases, are the reasons for drawing 
the distinction in the first place. As a result, the categories overlap and 
intersect in the reported case law in a somewhat confused fashion.31 
O ur concern here is to examine the operation of the restitutionary rules 
which apply once it has been determined that the agreement is unen­
forceable. In what circumstances may the minor or the other party 
recover the value of benefits conferred on the other through perfor­
mance of the unenforceable agreement? The answer to this question 
may vary to some extent from one category of unenforceability to the 
next. However, before turning to these problems, we here consider 
whether the liability of the m inor for necessaries is truly contractual or 
rests on principles of restitution.
C. THE NATURE OF THE MINOR’S LIABILITY FOR NECESSARIES
It is well established that a minor is obliged to pay the reasonable 
value of necessary goods and services which have been supplied. 
W hether the minor will be liable on an executory agreement for their 
supply will depend on whether the minor’s liability is contractual or 
restitutionary in nature. On this point there is little guidance in the 
case law. Although a majority o f the commentators32 appear to favour 
a restitutionary analysis, the present state of the authorities indicates 
that the point should be regarded as unsettled.
With respect to the supply o f necessary goods, a strong argum ent 
can be made for the view that the minor is not liable in contract. Modern 
English and Canadian authorities addressing this point, however, offer 
conflicting dicta.33 In Nash v. Inman,34 for example, Fletcher Moulton
s,See, generally, Percy, supra, footnote 2, for a useful review of the authorities.
**See, e.g., Wright, supra, footnote 21; |. D. Payne, The Contractual Liability of Infants, (1966) 
5 West. Ont. L. Rev. 136, at 139 et seq; C. H. C. Edwards, Infants' Liability in Contract, in Isaac 
Pitblado Lectures (1970), at 8; P. S. Atiyah, Introduction to the Law of Contract (2nd ed.) at 101-102; 
G. H. L. Fridman, Sale of Goods m Canada (1973), at 28; Anson’s Law of Contract (24th ed.), at 212 
et seq.; Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (9th ed.), at 404 et seq. This is the clearly established 
position in American law. See Williston, supra, footnote 21, s.240. And see, J. C. Miles, The Infant's 
Liability for Necessaries, (1927) 43 L. Q. Rev. 389. See, contra, Goff and Jones, supra, footnote 3, at 
309-311; Percy, Supra, footnote 2, at 9; Treitel, supra, footnote 21, at 370-371.
MFor Canadian dicta in support o f the restitutionary view, see R. v. Rash, supra, footnote 8, at 256, 
and Re Oberth and The Hospital Aid Act, [1936] 3 W.W.R. 474 (Man. K.B.), at 476. In support of 
the contractual view, see Beam v. Beatty (No. 2), supra, footnote 20, at 559, and Soon and Soon v. 
Watson et al. (1962), 38 W.W.R. 503 (B.C.S.C.), at 505.
**[1908] 2 K.B. 1 (C.A.), at 8, 77 L.J. K.B. 626, at 631. See also. Guardians of Pontypridd Union v. 
Drew, [1927] 1 K.B. 214 (C.A.), at 220, 95 L.J. K.B. 1030 at 1034. per Scnitton L.J.
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L.J. suggested that the obligation to pay a fair price for necessaries is 
imposed on the infant by law despite his contractual incapacity. In the 
same case, Buckley L.J. said that, “The plaintiff, when he sues the 
defendant for goods supplied during infancy, is suing him in contract on 
the footing that the contract was such as the infant, notwithstanding 
infancy, could make.”35 The liability actually imposed on the infant, 
however, appears to be restitutionary. Canadian sale o f goods legislation 
is patterned on section 2 of the English Sale of Goods Act,36 which 
provides as follows:
Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law concerning capacity 
to contract, and to transfer and acquire property. Provided that where 
necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant, or minor, or to a person who 
by reason o f  mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to contract, he 
must pay a reasonable price therefor.
Liability for necessary goods does not attach, then, until they have been 
actually delivered. Indeed, it is not possible to reach a definite conclusion 
as to whether the goods are necessaries until the time of delivery, for 
the legislation defines “necessaries” as, “goods suitable to the condition 
in life of such infant or minor . . . and to his actual requirements at the time 
of the sale and delivery.”37 The price to be paid must be a reasonable 
one, independently o f any agreement reached by the parties, though 
the infant would be entitled to enforce an advantageous price term 
since such agreements are, at the option of the minor, binding on the 
adult party.
In the context of necessary services, an English case, Roberts v. 
Gray,3* suggests that an executory contract for the provision of necessary 
services is binding on the infant, and thus supports the view that the 
minor’s liability for necessaries is contractual. It is difficult, however, to 
fashion a rationale for holding the infant to executory commitments 
of this kind. Indeed, Roberts v. Gray itself illustrates the unsatisfactory 
nature of the proposition.39 In that case, Gray, an infant, having 
determined that he wished to become a professional billiards player, 
agreed to accompany the plaintiff, Roberts, a well-established professional, 
on a tour. The infant was to receive instruction from Roberts and was 
to be employed by him during the tour. Roberts expended certain 
moneys in preparation for the tour, whereupon Gray resiled from his 
undertaking. Roberts claimed for damages for breach of contract and 
was awarded £1,500. An appeal taken by Gray was dismissed. The
ilNash v. Inman, ibid., at K.B. 12, L.J.K.B. 633.
” 56 & 57 Viet., c. 71, s.2.
S7Ibid., s.2 [emphasis added).
*•[1913] 1 K.B. 520, 82 L.J. K.B. 362 (C.A.).
J*The Latey Committee tersely remarked that they, “would not wish to see this case followed.” 
See The Latey Report, supra, footnote 7, s.314.
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Court of Appeal treated the claim as arising from a contract for the 
supply of necessary services in the form of instruction, and held that 
as such, it was binding on the infant, even though still executory. 
Although a num ber of grounds for distinguishing Roberts v. Gray have 
been suggested by those who favour a restitutionary approach to these 
problems,40 its effect, at the very least, is to place the m atter in some doubt.
In the face o f this uncertainty, a return  to basic considerations 
underlying the rules relating to minors’ contractual incapacity is appropri­
ate. The predom inant theme struck in the case law is the desirability 
of granting the infant an option to withdraw from undertakings which 
he has come to regret. The merits of this policy may be enhanced by the 
recent reductions of the age o f majority in Canadian jurisdictions41 
which have brought the attainment o f majority much closer to what is, in 
practical terms, the school-leaving age for most infants. Moreover, 
there do not appear to be compelling considerations in favour of holding 
the infant liable for damages on an executory agreement. One might 
argue that the imposition o f contractual liability would have the effect 
of encouraging suppliers of necessaries to deal with minors. Yet, as the 
Latey Committee pointed out,42 there is little evidence to suggest that the 
elusive distinction between necessaries and non-necessaries plays any part 
in the judgm ent exercised by a retailer who decides to enter into an agree­
ment with an infant.43 It may be that the apparent reluctance o f the English 
courts to confirm the restitutionary nature o f the liability of minors 
for necessaries is better explained, as Dean Wright has argued,44 as 
being linked to their general reluctance to acknowledge the validity of a 
theory of restitutionary liability which is distinct from contract and tort. 
If this is correct, further support for a restitutionary analysis of the 
minors’ liability in Canadian law may be drawn from the rejection of the 
“implied contract” rationale of restitutionary relief effected by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Deglman case.45
Regardless o f the ultimate disposition of this issue, it is clear that 
once the adult party has relied on tne agreement by supplying necessary 
goods or services, the minor is liable for their reasonable value, or, in 
cases where the minor affirms the contract in order to enforce an 
advantageous price term, such lesser amount as has been agreed to by 
the supplier.
‘•See, e.g., Cheshire and Fifoot, supra, footnote 32, at 406.
“ See supra, footnote 1.
trThe Latey Report, supra, footnote 7, s.318.
° T h e  vagaries o f this distinction are explored by Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 2-6.
44Wright, supra, footnote 21, at 321.
**Supra, footnote 5.
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D. RESTITUTION OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER 
UNENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS
The case law concerning restitutionary claims for benefits conferred 
under agreements unenforceable for infancy exhibits characteristics 
commonly observed elsewhere in the restitutionary case law.46 Some of 
the leading English authorities have relied heavily on the “implied 
contract” theory of restitutionary liability in rejecting claims of this nature. 
Canadian courts in recent years have departed from a strict application 
of the rules developed by the English courts and have demonstrated a 
greater willingness to order restitution o f benefits conferred. Two 
different categories o f claims are to be considered; claims brought by 
the minor, and claims brought by the other party. Each o f these categories 
will be further subdivided in terms of the various enforceability types 
described above.
1. Claims by Minor
(i) Voidable Agreements: Two distinct and conflicting lines o f authority 
have developed in Canadian and English case law dealing with the 
recovery of benefits conferred by minors under agreements which are 
voidable on the ground of infancy, either in the sense of being unenforce­
able until ratified or in the sense o f being binding until repudiated. 
In a num ber of cases the minor has been held entitled to restitution of 
the benefit conferred provided that a restitutio in integrum o f the adult 
party can be made. The alternative rule to be found in the authorities 
is that the m inor is entitled to restitution only if he has sustained a total 
failure o f consideration. This latter rule is more restrictive, in the sense 
that it severely limits the range o f situations in which the m inor can 
obtain restitution. These two approaches are considered in turn, 
beginning with the form er as it appears to be more consistent with the 
underlying policy of enabling a minor to avoid a depletion o f his own 
assets through the performance o f rashly given or improvident under­
takings. Moreover, it is an approach which has been more widely applied 
in Canada than in England.47
The use o f the phrase, restitutio in integrum, suggests an equitable 
origin for this doctrine and it is indeed clear that the doctrine will 
apply where equitable relief, such as the setting aside o f a deed, is
4*Sce, e.g. McCamus, supra, footnote 3.
*’It has been suggested that, in English law at least, the total failure o f consideration requirement 
applies to money claims whereas the duty to make restitutio m integrum will apply where a minor 
claims for the restoration o f property. See Cheshire and Fifoot, supra, footnote 32, at 411-413. 
This would not be a satisfactory statement o f the position in Canadian law, however, for a num ber 
of reasons: (a) the m odern Canadian cases cannot in fact be reconciled on this basis; (b) the Canadian 
courts have not explicitly adopted such a rationalization o f the case law; and (c) such a distinction 
has little to commend itself either in terms o f logic o r underlying policy.
required. In the Ontario case of Whalls v. Learn,4* for example, a young 
woman sought to recover land which she had conveyed as a minor to the 
defendants in return for a sum of money and the conveyance to her of 
other lands owned by the defendant. The plaintiff could not succeed, 
according to Chancellor Boyd, “. . . without making complete restoration 
to the defendants of the specific, or an equivalent, value o f that which 
she has received from the defendants.”49 In the result, the plaintiff 
was obliged to restore all benefits conferred by the defendants as a pre­
condition of her own restitutionary relief. It should be emphasized 
that restitution need not be made in specie. The courts exercise a broad 
discretion to award monetary equivalents for benefits which cannot be 
specifically restored. In Murray v. Dean,iC another Ontario case involving 
rescission of an agreement to exchange properties, the plaintiff, a minor, 
was obliged to pay the defendant for the value of certain benefits derived 
from his occupation of the defendant’s land. As well, the plaintiff was 
obliged to pay the defendant for the value of certain improvements 
which the defendant had made to the plaintiffs property.
Canadian courts have not restricted the application of this rule to 
cases involving equitable relief in the full sense, but have applied it 
in the context of claims to recover money paid,51 and presumably, it 
could be extended to claims for the value of goods or services supplied 
as well.52 Thus, in Sturgeon v. Storr53, Prendergast J. o f the Manitoba 
Supreme Court denied a m inor’s claim for recovery of purchase moneys 
paid to the defendant for certain chattels on the ground that the 
defendant, in the rather peculiar circumstances of that case, could not be 
restored to his form er position. The following statement of Prendergast J. 
has been relied on in subsequent Canadian cases:54
. . .  if  an infant pay money without valuable consideration, he can get it 
back; and if he pay money for valuable consideration, he may also recover it; 
but subject to the condition that he can restore the other party to his former 
position.55
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**Supra, footnote 12. See also, Phillips v. Sutherland (1910), 15 W.L.R. 594 (Man. K.B.). And see, 
Butterfield v. Sibbitt and Ntptssmg Electric Supply Company Ltd., supra, footnote 20.
**WhaUs v. Learn, supra, footnote 12, at 487.
**Supra, footnote 18.
*'Sturgeon v. Starr (1911), 17 W.L.R. 402 (Man. K.B.); Lafayette v. W. W. Distributors and Co. Ltd. 
(1965), 51 W.W.R. 685 (Sask. Dist. C.); Bo-Lassen v.Josiassen, [ 1973] 4 W.W.R. 317 (Alta. Dist. C.).
And see Nickltn v. Longhurst (1917), 27 Man. R. 255, [1917] 1 W.W.R. 439 (C.A.).
“ Although there is no Canadian authority on point, there is no reason in principle to treat these 
cases differently. See, e.g.. Carpenter v. Grow (1923), 247 Mass. 133, 141 N.E. 859.
lsSupra, footnote 51.
l*Lafayette v. W. W. Distributors and Co. Ltd., and Bo-Lassen v.Josiassen, supra, footnote 51.
**Sturgeon v. Starr, supra, footnote 51, at 404.
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In a more recent Alberta case, Bo-Lassen v. Josiassen,56 Buchanan J. 
drew support for these remarks from early English authorities57 and went 
on to allow recovery o f purchase moneys paid by a minor for a motor­
cycle, on the condition that the plaintiff restore the motorcycle to the 
defendant vendor. In the event that there had been interim enjoyment of 
the goods, the court could, it is suggested, rely by analogy on the land 
cases58 and deduct from the award an amount representing the value 
to the m inor o f such use o f the goods.
A num ber of issues remain to be resolved by the courts. It is not 
clear, for example, to what extent restitutio in integrum might be treated 
not only as a condition of obtaining restitutionary relief, but as a condition 
of avoiding the agreement in the first place. This issue is considered 
further in reviewing the general question o f the rights of the other 
party to obtain restitution from the minor.59
A second question which remains open is whether Canadian courts, 
following the restitutio in integrum line of authority, would exercise, 
as do the American courts, a discretion to waive the requirem ent of full 
restitution to the other party as a precondition of restitutionary relief 
for the minor in cases where a strict application of the rule would cause 
undue hardship to the minor. This might be appropriate where the 
benefit obtained by the minor has deteriorated in value or has been lost, 
parted with, or otherwise consumed. In some American cases, for example, 
minors have been permitted to avoid contracts for the purchase of auto­
mobiles and recover the amount paid toward the purchase price upon 
returning the vehicle in damaged condition.60 In the absence of over­
reaching by the other party or severe prejudice to the minor, resulting, for 
example, from his impecuniosity, such a rule may be unduly prejudicial 
to the interests of the adult.61
5*Supra, footnote 51.
17Holmes v. Blogg (1818), 8 Taunt. 508, 129 E.R. 481; Corpe v. Overton (1833), 10 Bing. 252, 131 E.R. 
901, 3 L.J. C.P. 24.
s,Whalls v. Learn, supra, footnote 12; Murray v. Dean, supra, footnote 18.
MSee, infra, the text at footnotes 78 to 105.
••This is the majority rule in American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Quality Motors Inc. v. Hays (1949), 
216 Ark. 264, 225 S.W. 2d 326; Hines v. Cheshire (1950), 36 Wash. 2d 467, 219 P. 2d 100; 
Fisher v. Taylor Motor Co. (1959), 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E. 2d 94; Bowling v. Sperry (1962), 133 Ind. App. 
692, 184 N.E. 2d 901. There are a num ber o f jurisdictions in which the infant seeking recovery is 
obliged to restore the value of benefits received. In others, legislation requiring iniams over the age 
of eighteen years to make full restitution has been enacted. See, generally, Annot., Infant's Liability 
for Use or Depreciation of Subject Matter, m Actum to Recover Purchase Price Upon His Disofftrtnance of 
Contract to Purchase Goods (1967), 12 A.L.R. 3d 1174. It is a different question, o f course, whether 
the minor who seeks merely to repudiate may be excused from making a full restitutio m mtegrum. 
For authorities suggesting that he may be so excused, see infra, the text at footnote 88 et seq.
"See Williston, supra, footnote 21, s.238.
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Although some support for the restitutio in integrum rule can be found 
in the English cases,®* the generally accepted view in England is that 
the infant cannot recover the value of benefits conferred unless there has 
been a total failure of consideration.*3 This approach has also been taken 
in a num ber o f Canadian cases in which claims have been brought by 
infants to recover benefits conferred under voidable agreements. Thus, 
infant purchasers have been denied recovery of money paid over to the 
vendor, whether by way of a deposit or as a full or partial payment of 
the purchase price. This rule has been applied in cases o f agreements 
which are voidable in the sense o f being binding until repudiated, such as 
agreements for the purchase of land, 4 and with respect to agreements 
which are voidable in the sense of not being binding until ratified, such 
as agreements to purchase non-necessary goods,65 on the basis that some 
interim enjoyment of the benefits of ownership had already occurred. 
The historical explanation for this doctrine would appear to be that the 
claims in question are claims for the recovery of money had and 
received, and as such were thought to be subject to the total failure of 
consideration requirem ent which was recognized as a necessary element of 
^Man-contractual money claims in other contexts.66 W hether this doctrine 
retains a contemporary vitality, or has now been superseded by the 
restitutio in integrum analysis, must be considered for the present an 
arguable point. It is suggested, however, that a review of the merits of 
these competing doctrines indicates that preference should be given to the 
latter.
As has already been indicated, the restitutio in integrum analysis seems 
more consistent with the underlying policy of permitting the infant to 
resile from disadvantageous bargains. The fact that the infant has enjoyed
•'See, e.g., Valentmt v. Canali (1889), 24 Q.B.D. 166, 59 L.J. Q.B. 74, where a contract was held 
“absolutely void” under the Infants Relief Act, 1874, and the infant was denied recovery because, 
according to Lord Coleridge C.J., at 167 (Q.B.D.), 76 (L.J. Q.B.), he "could not give back . . .  [the] 
benefit o r replace the detendant in the position in which he was before the contract." And see the 
discussion o f the earlier English authorities in Bo-Lassen v. Jasiassen, supra, footnote 51. See also, 
Treitel, supra, footnote 29, at 202-205; Atiyah, supra, footnote 29, at 101-103; Goff and Jones, 
supra, footnote 3, at 312.
••Sternberg v. Scala (Leeds) Ltd., [1923] 2 Ch. 452, 92 L.J. K.B. 944 (C.A.), and Pearce v. Bram, 
[1929] 2 K.B. 310, 98 L.J. K.B. 559 (contract "absolutely void” under the Infants Relief Act, 1874. 
See also, dicta in Chaplin v. Leslie Frewtn (Publishers) Ltd, [1966] Ch. 71, [1966] 2 W.L.R. 40, 
[1965] 3 All E.R. 764, criticized by Cheshire and Fifoot, supra, footnote 32, at 413. It may be that 
this rule will be applied to claims to recover money contributed to a partnership by a minor. 
See Ex parte Taylor (1856), 8 De G. M. & G. 254, 44 E.R. 388, 25 L.J. Bk. 35, denying a minor the right to 
recover premium paid on entering a partnership. Sed quaere. The American rule allows recovery 
subject to a deduction for amounts received from the partnership. See Will is ton, supra, footnote 21, 
s.229. Presumably, this rule would be applied in Canada, relying by analogy on the cases dealing 
with recovery o f land.
•*Short y. Field (1914), 32 O.L.R. 395 (C.A.); Robinson v. Moffat (1916), 35 O.L.R. 9 (C.A.).
••McDonald v. Baxter (1911), 46 N.S.R. 149, 9 E.L.R. 316 (S.C.); CouU v. Kolbuc (1969), 68 W.W.R. 
76 (Alta. Dist. Ct.), Fannon v. Dobranski (1970), 73 W.W.R. 371 (Alta. Dist. Ct.).
••See, e.g., Earl of Buckmghamshtre v. Drury (1761), 2 Eden 60. at 72, 28 E.R. 818, at 823, per Lord 
Mansfield.
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a modest benefit under the agreement does not seem to be sufficient 
reason for saddling him with the full measure o f his folly. At the same 
time, it may be quite appropriate to protect the interests of the adult by 
deducting the value o f the benefit received from the amount to be 
recovered by the infant. By requiring restoration of the status quo ante 
in this way, the restitutio in integrum analysis is capable of accommodating 
the legitimate interests o f both parties to the transaction. The total 
failure of consideration analysis, on the other hand, dictates an all-or- 
nothing approach. Indeed, the restrictiveness o f this doctrine has led to 
the development o f two rather strained interpretations of the total failure 
requirem ent which have the effect o f allowing restitutionary relief to the 
infant even though some consideration has already passed. First, in some 
cases the courts have restated the requirem ent in a more open-textured 
fashion, asking whether the infant has derived a real advantage from the 
consideration passed, and have granted the infant recovery of money paid 
even though the adult had already perform ed part of the bargain.67 
In other cases, however, the requirem ent has been given a very strict 
reading indeed. In a recent Alberta case, Fannon v. Dobranski,68 an 
infant purchaser, who drove his new car for some seventy miles, was 
held unable to resile from the transaction and recover the price or any 
portion thereof. A second method of narrowing the operation of the 
doctrine is illustrated by a nineteenth-century English case, Everett v. 
W i l k i n s There, the infant plaintiff had agreed to purchase a one-half 
share of the defendant’s business, the operation o f a public house. Part of 
the price was to be paid immediately, the rest at a future point in time. 
The defendant was to furnish the plaintiff and his wife with board and 
lodging in the public house and, upon payment o f the final instalment 
of the price, to share with him the proceeds o f the partnership. After 
paying the first instalment, moving into the public house, and sharing in 
the management o f the business, the plaintiff purported to repudiate 
the transaction and sued to recover the amount of the first instalment 
as money had and received. The claim was successful. The infant was 
awarded the amount paid less an adjustment to reflect the value of the 
board and lodging which had already been consumed by the plaintiff 
and his wife. The obligation to supply board and lodging was said to be 
merely collateral; there had been a total failure of consideration on the 
main obligation and the restitutionary action would lie. A more straight­
forward m ethod of achieving such a result is offered by the Canadian 
authorities which have adopted the restitutio in integrum analysis.
(ii) Agreements Void at Common Law: Where the agreement is void at 
common law, some support may be found in the Canadian authorities for
*TSee, e.g. Hamilton v. Vaughan-Skerrm Electrical Engmeermg Co., [1894] 3 Ch. 589, 63 L.J. Ch. 795, 
criticized on this point in Sternberg v. Scala (Leeds) Ltd., supra, footnote 63 and in Philips v. 
Greater Ottawa Development Co., supra, footnote 20. Cf. Rowland v. Dwall, [1923] 2 K B. 500, 92 
L.J. K.B. 1041 (C.A.).
**Supra, footnote 65.
••(1874), 29 L.T.R. 846 (Ex.).
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the view that the minor is allowed to recover benefits transferred to the 
adult, or their value, whether or not the minor has enjoyed benefits 
furnished by the adult and whether or not a restoration of the status quo 
ante is possible.70 It has been questioned, however, whether a rule so 
favourable to the minor’s position is desirable.71 In the absence of 
evidence of an intention to exploit the inexperience of the minor, it 
would seem to be appropriate to afford restitutionary protection to the 
adult by deducting from the award made to the infant a sum reflecting 
the value of benefits received. This could be accomplished simplv bv 
applying a restitutio in integrum analysis in such cases.72 An alternative, 
and for the reasons indicated above, a less satisfactory approach, would 
be to impose the total failure of consideration requirem ent as a pre­
requisite to restitutionary relief.73
(iii) Agreements “Absolutely Void” by Statute: The availability of resti­
tutionary relief to minors who have conferred benefits under agreements 
rendered “absolutely void” by the British Columbia Infants Act is a matter 
yet to be considered by a Canadian court. Nor is any guidance given 
by the statute itself. Since the underlying considerations of social policy 
are identical to those present in the cases dealing with agreements which 
are voidable at common law, it is suggested that the preferable view 
is that the m inor be allowed to recover the value of benefits conferred 
on the adult party, provided that a restitutio in integrum of the adult party 
can be effected — whether by a return of the benefit received in specie 
or by a reduction in the amount of the award to reflect the value of any 
benefit which has already been received by the infant plaintiff.74 It may 
be, however, that the English cases dealing with agreements nullified by 
a similar statutory provision and which suggest, though not unequivoc­
ally,75 that recovery of money76 or chattels77 is contingent upon a showing 
of a total failure of consideration, would be considered to be persuasive 
by a Canadian court confronted with this issue.
7%Re Staruch and Upper v. Lightning Fastener Employees' Credit Union (St. Catharines) Limited, supra, 
footnote 20.
’ 'Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 35.
’’Support for this approach may be drawn from Butterfield v. Sibbitt and Nipissmg Electric Supply 
Company Limited, supra, footnote 20. There, the infant plaintiffs release of a cause of action against 
the defendant was held void. The plaintiff was allowed to recover on the original cause o f action 
subject to a deduction for the amount o f the payment given for the release.
’’For dicta supporting this approach, see Phillips v. Greater Ottawa Development Co., supra, footnote 20, 
and Altobelli v. Wilson, supra, footnote 20.
74Supra, the text at footnotes 50 to 58.
7lSupra, footnote 62.
7tValentini v. Canali, supra, footnote 62.
77Pearce v. Brain, supra, footnote 63.
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2. Claims By The Other Party
Apart from cases involving the supply of necessaries,78 restitutionary 
protection is afforded to the other party to some degree by two different 
means. First, in some situations a duty is imposed on the m inor to make 
restitution — the extent of which is not established with certainty — either 
as a condition of being permitted to avoid the agreement or as a condition 
of being permitted to pursue his own restitutionary remedies.79 Second, 
the other party has been permitted in some circumstances to assert an 
affirmative restitutionary claim against the minor. The law relating to both 
of these matters is in a very unsettled state; the law relating to claims 
brought by the minor may by comparison appear to be remarkably well 
ordered.
There are a num ber of reasons for the more fluid state o f the law 
relating to the rights of the other party. In addition to the conflicting 
approaches of the restitutio in integrum rules — as against the total failure 
of consideration rules — we are here confronted by a much more 
delicately balanced policy issue. Whereas it is easily seen that restitutionary 
relief for the minor is quite consistent with the policy underlying the 
incapacity doctrine, it is more difficult to discern the correct position 
with respect to claims by the other party. Would the granting of in 
personam restitutionary relief to the other party subvert the policy of 
protecting minors from their inexperience? Or, may there not be circum­
stances where a restoration of the status quo ante would effect substantial 
justice for both parties? Further, the question of the relevance of English 
case law raises complex considerations in this area. The development 
of common law restitutionary principles in English law has been hindered 
by judicial reliance on the implied contract theory. For this reason, 
among others, there has been a tendency in English writing on the subject 
to seek a basis for restitutionary recovery in expanded notions of 
proprietary relief and in equitable claims against the minor based on a 
broadly construed doctrine of fraud. It may be, of course, that the 
demise of the implied contract theory in Canadian restitutionary law, 
when coupled with the fact that most of the modern English cases have 
been decided in the shadow of legislation80 which has been adopted in 
only one Canadian jurisdiction,81 provides a sound basis for suggesting 
that this English common law malady, and its equitable cure, need not 
be considered a part of Canadian law. At the same time it would be 
unwise to ignore the English jurisprudence in such an area as this where 
the Canadian doctrine exhibits much instability. Thus, in the following 
discussion, while emphasis is given to the approach taken in the Canadian
1*Supra, text at footnotes 32 to 45.
7#This latter aspect has been considered in detail in the preceding section and therefore need be 
considered only very briefly in this context.
'T h e  Infants Relief Act (1874), 37 & 38 Viet., c.62.
*'British Columbia. See the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.193.
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material, reference is also made to the English material where it appears to 
provide either additional remedial doctrines or alternative models of 
analysis. We return, then, to a consideration o f the various categories of 
enforceability with a view to ascertaining the restitutionary rights o f the 
other party to the agreement.
(i) Voidable Agreements: If the agreement in question is one which is 
voidable in the sense of being binding until repudiated by the minor, the 
act of repudiation will revest in the original owner property transferred 
under the agreement.** Additionally, where the m inor is seeking the 
restoration of the property transferred, he will be required to repay the 
value o f benefits he has received, whether through use o f the other 
party’s property or otherwise.83 W'hether this duty to make a full 
restitutio in integrum would be imposed more generally on the m inor as a 
condition of disaffirming such an agreement is doubtful.84
T here is some authority for the view that a minor will be permitted 
to recover moneys paid to the other party only if he can establish 
failure of consideration.85 Paradoxically, this would go well beyond 
restitutionary protection o f the other party; it would permit him to profit 
from the unenforceable agreement, perhaps handsomely and unex­
pectedly, by retaining benefits conferred by the m inor without being 
required to account for their value. It is argued here that preference 
ought to be given to a conflicting line of authority which would permit 
the minor to succeed in a restitutionary claim only if he can make 
restitution to the other party.88
If the agreement is voidable in the sense o f being not binding until 
ratified, the m inor who avoids the agreement and seeks restoration of 
benefits conferred may be required to make a full restitutio in integrum 
to the other party.87 Where the m inor is not actively seeking restitution 
the other party’s position is less secure. Since the agreement is not 
binding on the minor ab initio, it is theoretically not necessary for him 
to come forward and repudiate the agreement to escape his obligations. 
Further, property in any goods supplied will pass to the minor under the
"WiUtams on Vendor and Purchaser (4th cd.), at 847, and Goff and Jones, supra, footnote 3, at 313.
“ See, e.g., Whalls v. Learn, supra, footnote 12, and Murray v. Dean, supra, footnote 18. See also, 
supra, text at footnote 48 et seq.
“ Some Canadian courts, dealing with contracts which are generally classified as not binding until 
ratified, have suggested that such a duty is to be imposed us a condition o f disaffirmance. See
infra, footnote 90. See also, Lemprihe v. Lange (1879), 12 Ch. D. 675, 41 L.T.R. 378 (C.A.).
MShort v. Field and Robinson v. Moffat, supra, footnote 64.
"Supra, the text at footnote 47 et seq.
*r!bid.
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agreem ent.88 Hence, a minor who purchases non-necessary goods, for 
example, may take delivery, refuse to pay, and await suit. If, in the face 
o f the m inor’s refusal to pay, the other party demands a return  o f the 
goods supplied, there is authority for the view that this will have the 
effect of revesting property in the supplier and will provide a basis for an 
action in detinue.8® Alternatively, the other party may bring an action to 
enforce the agreement. The court may in such circumstances afford 
restitutionary protection to the other party by requiring the minor to 
make restitution to some extent as a condition of being perm itted to 
raise the defence o f minority. Some Canadian cases suggest that a 
voidable contract can only be avoided if the minor returns the property 
he has received “or its value.90 These statements have been criticized 
by one judge of the Ontario High C ourt91 as being “too broad,” and 
indeed, a strict rule requiring full restitution by the minor as a condition 
of avoidance could do much to underm ine the protection afforded 
minors by the unenforceability rules. It is clear, however, that, at the 
very least, the minor can be called upon to restore whatever remains 
in specie of the benefit received.92 Further, where the benefit has 
deteriorated in value, or has been lost, wasted, consumed or otherwise 
disposed o f after attaining the age of majority, the form er m inor may be 
required to pay the remaining value o f the benefit as o f the time of his 
reaching majority.93 Thus, in an Ontario case, Louden Manufacturing
••The o ther party is under a binding obligation to pass property. Property in goods supplied by the 
minor would pass as well. See, e.g., McGaw v. Fisk (1908), 38 N.B.R. 354 (C.A.); Chaptin v. 
Leslie Frewm (Publishers) Ltd., supra, footnote 63. Cf. the question o f property passage under 
absolutely void agreements discussed infra, at footnote 116 et seq.
MMcGaw v. Fisk, ibid. The difficulty with this position is that it may run afoul o f the rule that actions 
in tort cannot be employed as a means o f indirect enforcement o f the m inor’s undertaking. 
See, e.g., Ballett v. Mmgay, [1943] 1 K.B. 281, [1943] 1 All E.R. 143 (C.A.) (detinue sustained 
against a m inor in breach o f the terms o f bailment because on these facts the tortious conduct is 
independent o f o r outside the contract). We agree, however, with those writers who have suggested 
that detinue should generally be permitted since the thrust o f the action is not to enforce the 
agreement but to effect a restoration o f the status quo ante. See Payne, supra, footnote 32, at 150, 
and P. S. Atiyah, The Uability of Infants in Fraud and Restitution (1959), 22 Mod. L. Rev. 273, at 281.
-R e  Hutton Estate et aL, [1926] 3 W.W.R. 609, at 611, [1926] 4 D.L.R. 1080 (Alta. S.C.) at 1082-1083. 
And see Blackwell v. Farrow, [1948] O.W.N. 7 (H.C.).
*xButterfield v. Sibbitt and Nipissing Electric Supply Company Limited, supra, footnote 20, at 510, per 
Ferguson J.
**Louden Manufacturing Co. v. Milmtne (1907), 14 O.L.R. 532, a f fd  15 O.L.R. 53 (D.C.); 
Butterfield v. Sibbitt and Nipusmg Electric Supply Limited, supra, footnote 20; Noble’s Ltd. v. Bellefleur 
(1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 519 (N.B.C.A.), relying on Williston, supra, footnote 21, s.238, and 31 
Corpus Juris, at 1070-1071. T he cases do not clearly establish whether the duty imposed here is 
in rem on the theory, presumably, that property has revested in the plaintiff. If  it is, it would 
appear that the duty does not extend to cover the case o f a resale or barter which occurs prior 
to the plaintiffs attempt to revest property in himself. Property in the original goods having passed 
to the minor by this point, the plaintiff would have no proprietary right to assert against the minor 
and therefore could not trace at common law into the proceeds o r substitute goods. As to the 
potential relevance of equitable tracing rules, see infra, footnotes 96 and 127. See also, Atiyah, 
supra, footnote 89, at 290.
Louden Manufacturing Co. v. Milmtne, ibid; Great West Implement Co. v. Grams (1908), 8 W.L.R. 160 
(Alta. C.A.); Motyneux v. Traill, supra, footnote 8; Noble’s Ltd. v. Bellefleur, ibid.
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Company v. Milmine,94 a defendant, who had purchased non-necessary 
goods as a minor, was held liable to pay to the seller the value o f that 
portion of the goods which he had retained at majority and subsequently 
resold to a third party. This rule also applies to money paid to the 
minor and retained at majority.95
Application of these various strands of Canadian case law to the 
question of the rights of a lender who has advanced money to an infant 
borrower poses similar problems. Presumably, to the extent that the 
moneys remain traceable,96 a duty to restore them to the lender would 
be imposed.97 To the extent that the moneys advanced have been spent 
by the minor on necessaries98 or on the purchase o f land99 the lender 
would be permitted to obtain restitution on the basis of the doctrine of 
subrogation. W hether a duty to make full restitution would be imposed 
in the absence of these factors is another matter. If the contract of loan 
were harsh and oppressive, and so held to be void rather than merely 
voidable, it seems very likely that the minor would not be burdened with a 
general duty to make full in personam restitution.100 If the contract of 
borrowing were merely voidable, however, reliance might be placed on 
those Canadian authorities which suggest that the m inor must make a full 
restitutio in integrum as a condition o f avoiding the agreem ent.101 At the 
least, it would appear that the lender is entitled to claim for such of the 
moneys advanced as were retained at majority.102
In sum, then, the Canadian case law in this context again suggests 
two alternative and conflicting rules. A duty to make full in personam 
restitution is suggested by some cases. O ther cases suggest that the 
minor can only be callea upon to restore benefits retained in specie
t4Supra, footnote 92.
9tMolyneux v. Traill, supra, footnote 8. The defendant was an infant seller who had improperly 
retained a deposit paid by the plaintiff purchaser. The court held that recovery of the amount of 
the deposit was warranted on the authority o f Louden Manufacturing Co. v. Milmtne. There was no 
evidence to show that the moneys paid over by the plaintiff were traceable in the defendant's hands.
••There appears to be no Canadian authority on point. To the extent that the funds are 
traceable at law, recovery is supported by the authorities referred to, supra, footnotes 89 and 92. 
The recoverability of funds traceable only in equity will turn on the extent to which Canadian 
courts are willing to depart from the requirement o f English law that there be a fiduciary relationship 
between the parties, or to “find” a fiduciary relationship present in these situations (see infra, 
footnote 127.
•’Relying, by analogy, on Molyneux v. Traill, supra, footnote 8.
••Marlow v. Pitfield (1719), 1 P Wms. 558, 24 E.R. 516; Glass v. Munsen (1865), 12 Gr. 77 (Ont.); Lewis v. 
AUeyne (1888), 4 T.L.R. 560, 32 S.J. 486 (C.A.).
**Nottmgham Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Thurstan, supra, footnote 11 (H.L.) (lender subrogated 
to vendor’s lien).
,0*Supra, the text at footnotes 70 to 73.
'Supra, the text at footnote 47 et seq.
lMMolyneux v. Traill, supra, footnote 8 (money paid as a deposit held recoverable). And see the 
authorities cited, supra, footnote 93.
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during his minority, but can be compelled to make full in personam 
restitution of benefits retained at majority, whether or not they have 
deteriorated or have been disposed o f by the time of the action. Although 
the weight o f authority may be said to favour the latter approach, the 
m atter has not been the subject of a clear pronouncem ent by a Canadian 
court o f high authority and may be regarded as open.
A rather different approach has been taken by the English courts, 
though, again, the task o f ascertaining the present position is a daunting 
one. Since the m odern English law has been rendered in the context of 
agreements “absolutely void” under the Infants' Relief Act, the problems are 
canvassed below with reference to that category of unenforceability.103 
It is sufficient for the present to note that where the agreement has been 
induced by fraud104 on the part of the minor, an equitable duty to make 
restitution has been imposed on the minor. This may provide an additional 
avenue o f relief for the other party.105
(ii) Agreements Void at Common Law: The question o f the other party’s 
ability to obtain restitution of benefits conferred under agreements void at 
common law has not been directly addressed in the Canadian case law. 
With regard to money borrowed by the minor, however, the lender would 
be granted restitution with regard to moneys used by the minor to purchase 
land or necessaries on the basis of the doctrine o f subrogation.106 
Further, it is arguable that the m inor is subject to a duty to restore 
identifiable money or goods retained by the minor either upon the occasion 
of a suit brought by the other party to enforce the contract during 
his m inority107 or upon attaining majority.108 Again, the English doc­
trines based on fraudulent conduct by the minor may afford relief.108
lt3lnfra, the text at footnotes 115 to 144.
1#4The proper definition of the term in this context is a question of some nicety. See infra, the 
text at footnotes 128 to 140.
‘•‘Although it appears that the Canadian case law considered in the text would extend recovery 
in all situations covered by the English fraud doctrines, regardless o f whether or not fraud in the 
requisite sense can be established, the unsettled nature o f the Canadian authorities suggests that 
counsel for the other party may do well to maintain a few English strings for his bow. Cf. 
Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 43.
lMSupra, footnotes 98 and 99.
1#TBy analogy to the case law on voidable agreements; see supra, footnotes 92 , 96 and 97. 
Alternatively, it is arguable that proprietary relief is available on the theory that property would 
revest in the other party upon a demand for its return. See discussion, supra, footnote 89. 
A further alternative would be to place proprietary relief on the basis that property would not pass 
at all under a contract void at common law. Indeed, it appears to have been assumed by Roach 
J. dissenting in McBnde v. Appleton, supra, footnote 21, that property would not pass. The 
contrary view is, however, preferable, both on authority (see infra, footnote 116) and on principle 
(see, mfra, the text at footnotes 141 to 142).
‘“ Additionally, there would be a duty to account for deterioration, loss or other disposition of the 
goods occurring after majority has been attained; see discussion supra, footnote 93.
'"Infra, the text at footnotes 128 to 140.
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Beyond this it is doubtful that a general duty to make restitution 
would be imposed. Certainly, it has been held in some cases that the 
minor can seek restitution even though he can no longer effect a 
restitutio in integrum o f the other party. 10 Further, in situations where 
the contract is held void because it is harsh and oppressive it may be 
reasonable to deprive the other party o f the protection o f the unjust 
enrichment principle, in order to provide a disincentive for those who 
would take advantage o f the immaturity and inexperience of a minor. In 
the absence o f evidence o f such oppression, it is arguable that restitutionary 
uuties ~ould be imposed on the minor to the same extent as if the 
contract were considered merely voidable.111
(iii) Agreements “Absolutely Void," by Statute: The British Columbia 
Infants A ct112 is silent on the question o f whether benefits conferred 
by the other party under an agreement rendered “absolutely void” by 
its provisions are recoverable. Moreover, the question has not been 
considered by a Canadian court. As a matter of general principle, it 
might be suggested that the underlying considerations of policy are 
identical to those present in the case of an agreement which is voidable 
at common law.113 Inasmuch as the statute does not indicate an intention 
to diminish the restitutionary rights of the other party, it is arguable 
that the remedies available to the other party under Canadian law dealing 
with voidable agreements should be available in this context as well.114
In the absence o f Canadian authority directly on point, however, 
it is likely that our courts would seek guidance from the English case 
law considering agreements rendered “absolutely void” by the Infants’ 
Relief Act, 1874.115 It is therefore necessary to review the English position 
in some detail, even though the m odern English cases in this area are 
inconsistent with the principles o f Canadian restitutionary law. First 
considered are the rights of the other party at common law, and then 
under doctrines of equity.
The common law remedies available to the other party are, in the 
absence of tortious conduct on the minor’s part, virtually non-existent. 
It appears to be accepted that property in goods will pass to the minor
ll*Re Staruch, and Upper v. Ltghtnmg Fastener Employees' Credit Union (St. Catharines) Limited, supra, 
footnote 20. Cf. Butterfield v. Sibtntt and Nipissmg Electric Supply Company Limited, supra, footnote 20.
11'See, generally, Percy, supra, footnote 2, at 32 et seq.
"•R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 193.
" ’Many o f the transactions rendered void by the statutory provision would be held voidable at 
common law.
l l*Supra, the text at footnote 82 et seq.
>'»37 & 38 Vkt., c.62.
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and, hence, that proprietary remedies are precluded,116 though it has 
been suggested by Professor Atiyah that property in moneys paid to the 
minor may not pass and that they are, therefore, amenable to recovery 
in an in rent claim in money had and received so long as they remain 
traceable.117 The in personam ^tion-contractual claims appear to be barred 
by application o f the implied contract theory. The minor cannot be 
liable ex contractu, it is said,118 and this precludes any liability in money 
had and received, or in any other common count, where »he substance 
of the claim is ex contractu rather than ex delicto. In Cowem  v. N ield,119 
a m inor who traded in hay and straw undertook to supply the plaintiff 
with clover and hay. The minor delivered rotten clover which was 
properly rejected by the plaintiff, and failed to deliver the hay. The 
plaintiff sued to recover moneys paid as a partial payment of the 
contract price, either as damages for breach of contract or as money 
had and received. The minor successfully raised his infancy as a 
defence to both claims. Only in circumstances where the defendant 
was guilty of fraud, and was therefore liable ex delicto, could the 
claim have succeeded.120 Similarly, in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill,121 the 
English Court o f Appeal denied a claim brought by a moneylender in 
money had and received to recover moneys lent to a minor who had 
fraudulently misrepresented that he was o f full age. Moreover, it was 
held by the Court that any attempt to recover in a tort action for deceit 
would run aground on the principle that, “Although an infant may be 
liable in tort generally, he is not answerable for a tort directly connected 
with a contract which, as an infant, he would be entitled to avoid.”122 
Although writers have strongly criticized both the reasoning and the result 
of each of these cases,123 it is evident that they create a serious
‘'"Stocks v. Wilson, and Watts v. Seymour, supra, footnote 21. Cf. McBride v. Appleton, supra, footnote 21.
111 Atiyah, supra, footnote 89, at 283-285, relying by analogy on the proposition advanced by Lord 
Haldane in Sinclair v. Brougham et aL, [1914) A.C. 398, at 420 L.J. Ch. 465, at 476, to the 
effect that the proprietary remedy at law for money lent under an ultra vires agreement would 
persist, so long as the money were traceable, until a debtor/creditor relationship intervened. The 
sole virtue o f this approach is that it provides for at least some recovery — albeit anomalously 
only for identifiable money — in the context o f rules which are generally perceived as being too 
hostile to claims by the other party. A more satisfactory approach, it is suggested, would be to hold 
that all property passes to the minor but that in appropriate circumstances, m personam claims 
against the minor are allowable. See infra, the text at footnotes 141 to 142.
"•See.i.g. Bristow v.Eastman (1794), 1 Esp. 172 at 173,170E.R.317;C<m*rn Nield, [1912]2 K.B.419at423, 
81 L.J. K.B. 865 at 867; R. Leslie Ltd. v. SheiU, [1914] 3 K.B. 607, at 612-613, 83 L.J. K.B. 1145, 
at 1149 per Lord Sumner, at 621-622 (K.B ), 1154 (L.J. K.B.) per Kennedy J., and at 626 (K.B ), 
1157 (L.J. K.B.) per A. T. Lawrence J.
"•Ibid.
'**A new trial was ordered on the issue o f whether the minor had obtained the money by fraud.
“ ‘Su^ra, footnote 118.
'••Ibid., at 611 (K.B.), 1148 (L.J. K.B.), per Lord Sumner. And see tbid., at 620 (K.B ), 1153 
(L.J. K.B.) per Kennedy J.. and at 625 (K.B ). 1156 (L.J. K.B.),per A. T. Lawrence J.
“ ‘See, e.g., Goff and Jones, supra, footnote 3, at 22-23 and 313-314.
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impediment to the granting of in personam restitutionary relief at common 
law. To summarize, the other party probably has no proprietary remedy 
at common law, except, perhaps, in the case of money paid to the minor, 
no remedy in tort unless the tort is not “directly connected” with the 
contract, and no in personam remedy in «/i^wi-contract except in cases where 
the liability is in substance ex delicto and it is appropriate to waive the 
tort and sue in assumpsit. 124
The rules o f equity afford a greater measure o f relief for the other 
party. In the first place, money lent which is used by the minor to 
purchase necessaries or land may be recoverable under the doctrine of 
subrogation.125 Second, if the suggestion that property in money does not 
pass to the minor under an “absolutely void” agreement be accepted,126 
it is arguable that the equitable tracing rules may be applied in aid of the 
other party’s claim to follow the money into its product.127 Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, there is authority for the granting of an equity 
of restitution128 to the other party in situations where the minor has 
acted fraudulently. In Stocks v. Wilson,129 Lush J. put forward an inter­
pretation of this doctrine in terms very favourable to the interests of 
the other party. The defendant minor had induced the plaintiff to 
supply him with non-necessary goods on credit by misrepresenting his 
age. Having taken delivery of the goods, the defendant then resold a 
portion of them and granted a bill of sale on the rest as security for a 
loan. He then refused to pay the contract price. After the defendant 
had attained his majority, the plaintiff sued to recover, inter alia, the 
reasonable value of the goods supplied. Lush J., allowing recovery of 
the proceeds of the resale and the borrowing, rem arked:130
What the Court o f Equity has done in cases o f  this kind is to prevent the 
infant from retaining the benefit o f  what he has obtained by reason o f  his 
fraud. It has done no more than this, and this is a very different thing from 
making him liable to pay damages or compensation for the loss o f  the other 
party’s bargain. If the infant has obtained property by fraud he can be 
compelled to restore it; if he has obtained money he can be compelled to
,,4See Bristow v. Eastman, supra, footnote 118 (minor who embezzled his master’s money held 
liable in money had and received). On waiver of tort generally, see Goff and Jones, supra, footnote
3, c. 33.
lttSupra, footnotes 98 and 99.
'•^Su^ra, footnote 117.
•’’Professor Atiyah argues persuasively on several grounds against the orthodox view that a fiduciary 
relationship is required in English law to permit the application of equitable tracing rules: 
(i) there is no reason to require the relationship in any case where property at law has not passed 
{semble on the theory that, a fortiori, property would not pass in equity); (ii) in any event the 
fiduciary requirement may be met by impressing the funds in the minor's hands with a resulting 
trust; (iii) it may not be necessary to establish a fiduciary relationship if fraud can be established. 
See Atiyah, supra, footnote 89, at 288 to 290.
'■•It is clear that the remedy is restitutionary in nature only and would not enable enforcement 
of the contract. See Levene v. Brougham (1909), 25 T.L.R. 265 (C.A.).
“ Ŝû ra, footnote 21.
l l*IbuL, at 242-243 (K.B.), 602 (L.J. K.B.).
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refund it. If he has not obtained either, but has only purported to bind 
him self by an obligation to transfer property or to pay money, neither in a 
Court o f  Law nor a Court o f  Equity can he be compelled to make good his 
promise or to make satisfaction for its breach.
Moreover, Lush j .  was o f the view that Equity’s jurisdiction was in 
personam in nature rather than proprietary and, hence, that the minor 
could be called upon to account for the proceeds out of his general 
assets.131
If Mr. Justice Lush’s remarks can be coupled with the traditionally 
broad view of the nature of fraud taken by the courts o f equity, the 
equitable in personam restitutionary claim would afford relief to the other 
party in a wide range o f circumstances. Certainly, a misrepresentation of 
age will be considered fraudulent for these purposes.132 Indeed, despite 
the existence of modern dicta restricting the rule to such cases,133 
support may be found for the view that the mere fact that the minor 
wishes to retain the property which he has obtained while at the same 
time pleading infancy as a defence to a claim for its value, is fraudulent 
conduct in the requisite sense. In an earlier case, Clarke v. Cobley, 134 a 
minor had given a bond to a creditor in return  for a surrender by the 
creditor of promissory notes issued by the m inor’s wife. The bond being 
unenforceable, the creditor was perm itted to recover the notes even 
though the report of the case does not expressly indicate that a fraudulent 
misrepresentation of age had been m ade.135 Although it has now been
is,lbid., at 247 (K.B.), 604 (L.J. K.B.). Lush J. relied, inter alia, on Re King, Ex parte Unity Joint 
Stock Mutual Bankmg Association (1858), 3 De G. & J. 63, 44 E.R. 1192, 27 L.J. Bk. 33, in which an infant 
bankrupt who had obtained a loan from the claimant banking association by traudulently misstating his 
age, was held liable for repayment o f the debt. The claimant did not obtain a priority over the general 
creditors and the case therefore suggests that an in personam duty to pay can be imposed. And see, 
Maclean v. Dummett (1869), 22 L.T. 710 (P.C.). Re King was doubted by the Court of Appeal, 
though not overruled, in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Shrill, supra, footnote 118, at 616-617 (K.B.), 1151-1152 
(L.J. K.B.), per Lord Sumner. See also, Miller v. Blankley (1878), 38 L.T.R. 527. For authority 
indicating that although the infant ought not be held liable for the debt (as in Re King), a duty 
to make restitution would nonetheless be imposed, see Bartlett v. Wells (1862), 1. B. & S. 836, 
31 L.J. Q.B. 57, 121 E.R. 924 De Roo v. Foster (1862), 12 C.B. (N.S.) 272, 142 E.R. 1148. Cf. 
Lempriere v. Lange, supra, footnote 84, in which it was held that a lessor could bring an action 
to avoid a lease induced by a misrepresentation of age by the infant lessee, but could not recover 
the value o f use and occupation up to the time of avoidance; semble, because this would permit the 
lessor to approbate and reprobate. On the contrary, it is submitted that allowing such recovery 
would merely effect restitution.
1MSee, e.g., Nelson v. Stocker (1859), 4 De G. 8c J. 458, 45 E.R. 178; Maclean v. Dummett, ibid.; 
Bartlett v. Wells, ibid.; DeRoo v. Foster, ibid.; Gayer v. Morrison (1878), 26 Gr. 69 (Ont.); Jewell v. 
Broad (1909), 19 O.L.R. 1 (H.C.), afTd (1909), 20 O.L.R. 176 (D.C.); Noble’s Ltd. v. Bellefleur, 
supra, tootnote 92.
,ssStikeman v. Dawson (1847), 1 De G & Sm. 90 at 103, 63 E.R. 984, at 990, 16 L.J. Ch. 205 at 212; 
Ex parte Jones (1881), 18 Ch.D. 109, 50 L.J. Ch. 673 at 678; Re Hodson, [1894 ] 2 Ch. 421, at 427; 
Confederation Life Association v. Kinnear (1896), 23 O.A.R. 497 at 499, per Haggarty C.J.O.
I,4(1789), 2 Cox 133, 30 E.R. 80.
'“ Atiyah, supra, footnote 89 at 273 to 276 relies on the following as authority for the view that 
equity will take a broader approach to fraud than law in dealing with infants: Savage v. Foster 
(1723), 9 Mod. 35; 88 E.R. 299; Watts v. CressweU (1714), 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 515, 22 E.R. 435; Earl of 
Buckinghamshire v. Drury, supra, footnote 66; Cory v. Gertcken (1816), 2 Madd. 40, 56 E.R. 250; Overton 
v. Bannister (1844), 3 Hare 503, 67 E.R. 479; Wng'U v. Snowe (1848), 2 De G. & Sm. 321, 64 E.R. 
144. Further support for this view is to be found in Salmond and Williams on Contracts (2d ed.), 319.
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clearly established that a mere nondisclosure of age which is not 
accompanied by an enrichment of the minor will not be considered 
“fraudulent” in the broader equitable sense,136 there is much force in 
Professor Atiyah’s submission that, “There is nothing in the later cases 
which detracts from the authority of the earlier cases, and these clearly 
show that for an infant to attempt to obtain something for nothing is, 
in effect, fraud in the eye o f equity.”137
Even if this broader view of the meaning of fraud in this context is 
to be accepted, it must be considered whether, or to what extent, Mr. 
Justice Lush’s view of the breadth of the equity of restitution, which is 
contingent on the finding o f fraud, survives the decision of the English 
Court o f Appeal in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill. 138 Although the Court did 
not overrule Stocks v. Wilson, Lord Sumner did say that Mr. Justice Lush’s 
statement of the equitable jurisdiction to require restitution was “open to 
challenge.” Further, his Lordship had, “difficulty in seeing what liability 
to account [for the proceeds] there can be.”139 In any event, he would not 
apply such a doctrine to the facts of the case at hand, since the money 
borrowed by the defendant m inor had apparently been used by him, 
and thus, “no question of tracing it, no possibility of restoring the very 
thing got by the fraud,” remained. Similarly, A. T. Lawrence J., in the 
course of reviewing the authorities, commented, “If when the action is 
brought both the property and the proceeds are gone, I see no ground 
upon which a Court o f Equity could have founded its jurisdiction.”140 
Although the reasoning of the court may be considered obiter insofar as 
it treats of matters beyond the case at hand — the borrowing of money 
by a minor followed by dissipation of the proceeds o f the loan — it is 
clear that in the opinion of the Court, the equity o f restitution relied 
on by Lush J. is to be considered proprietary in nature.
Restricting the other party to proprietary remedies has the obvious 
merit o f protecting the impecunious or irresponsible minor who has 
dissipated or lost the value of the benefit conferred. Moreover, artful 
application o f the equitable tracing rules may go some considerable 
distance in the direction o f affording a remedy against any minor who 
has money in hand .141 However, it is submitted that the proprietary 
approach to restitutionary relief in this context is unsatisfactory for a 
num ber of reasons. It would have the effect of giving priority, in the 
case o f the insolvency o f the infant, to a supplier o f non-necessary
ll*StiMeman v. Dawson, and Ex parte Jones, supra, footnote 133. And see Atiyah, supra, footnote 89 at 275. 
,STSupra, footnote 89, at 275. 
ls*Supra, footnote 118.
at 619 (K.B.), 1153 (L.J. K.B.).
'"Ibid., at 637 (K.B.), 1157 (L.J. K.B.).
,tlSupra. footnote 127.
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goods over a supplier of necessaries. Further, it places recovery on the 
ground of traceability and leaves open the question o f whether a fiduciary 
duty and/or fraud of some unspecified nature must be established in 
order to trace under the equitable rules.142 Finally, if accepted, it would 
draw anomalous distinctions between traceable benefits, such as goods, 
and untraceable benefits, such as services.
Goff and Jones143 have attempted to preserve the broader views 
expressed by Lush J. in Stocks v. Wilson by restricting the rationale of 
R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill to the case of loans to minors, on the theory that 
the ordering of repayment of moneys borrowed would constitute a more 
direct attack on the underlying policy o f protection o f minors than would 
an in personam duty to account for proceeds o f a re-sale of goods supplied. 
However, there appear to be difficulties with this suggestion. Although 
this writer would view sympathetically any attempt to restrict the scope of 
R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill, it is difficult to see any basis in policy for 
distinguishing between an in personam duty to repay money borrowed 
from the plaintiff and an in personam duty to repay money acquired at 
the plaintiffs expense by taking delivery o f his goods and re-selling 
them. If  the proprietary theory were to be accepted in one context, it 
would seem to be dispositive of the other as well. A sound rationalization 
of the English law of restitution in this area awaits an abandonment 
of the “implied contract” fiction and an adoption o f the proposition 
suggested by some Canadian courts, to the effect that in appropriate 
circumstances a duty to make restitutio in integrum can be imposed on a 
minor who wishes to rely on the unenforceability of his undertaking 
and, at the same time, retain benefits conferred by the other party. 
Certainly, if the dicta expressed in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill are to be considered 
authoritative, English courts are much less accommodating o f the resti- 
tutionary interests of the other party than are their Canadian counter­
parts.144
E. CONCLUSION
It has been correctly said that the law of minors’ contracts, “is complex, 
and the complexities of the law are not related to the needs of persons 
affected by it.”145 The intricate and unsettled nature of the rules on
lA*Supra, footnote 127.
x**Supra, footnote 3, at 319-320. Goff and |ones have expressed as their preferred view, however, 
that the policy against unjust enrichment ought to prevail in these circumstances and they therefore 
favour the over-ruling o f R. Leslie Ltd. v. ScheilL
luSupra, the text at footnote 138 et. seq. Ironically, the one modern Canadian appellate decision 
which appears to accept the view that R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill has over-ruled Stocks v. Wilson, adopts a 
position, relying on American authority, which goes considerably beyond the proprietary theory 
advanced in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill See Noble's Ltd. v. Bellefleur, supra, footnote 92 (dictum: infant 
liable m personam for the value o f benefits retained upon attaining majority whether or not they 
have been subsequently wasted or disposed of.)
' ‘T he Latey Report, supra, footnote 7, s.273.
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enforceability and restitution evidence the extreme difficulty encountered 
by the courts in their attempt to develop a mechanism for adjusting the 
conflicting interests of inexperienced youth, on the one hand, and the 
supplier in good faith of money, goods or services, on the other. Some 
observers have taken the view that the law in this area is beyond judicial 
repair and that a sound restatement o f the law can be effected only by 
legislative enactment. A review of the Canadian case law suggests, 
however, that some steps toward a modern restatement of the doctrine 
have already been taken by our courts, and it may be that recognition 
of the doctrine of unjust enrichment as the underlying principle in this 
area will facilitate both a further rejection of the difficulties presented 
by the English analyses o f these problems and a continued development 
of a more workable set o f rules.
The problem of the m inor’s right to restitution is easily solved. 
There is no reason consistent with underlying policy considerations for 
denying relief. The difficulty presented by the English case law is that 
money cannot be recovered by the minor unless there has been a total 
failure of consideration. Canadian courts, on the other hand, have moved 
toward acceptance of a general principle that the minor is entitled to 
restitution, provided that he makes restitution to the other party.146
Analysis o f the restitutionary rights of the other party who has 
supplied money or non-necessary goods or services presents a more 
intractable problem. The alternative approaches which may be derived 
from the English cases present something of a dilemma. To restrict the 
other party to proprietary relief, as the English Court of Appeal suggested 
in R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill, is consistent with the policy of protection of minors 
but has seemed to a num ber o f courts to unfairly prejudice the other partv. 
Moreover, as has been indicated, there are a num ber of anomalies 
inherent in rules premised on a proprietary theory of restitutionary relief. 
On the other hand, the adoption of a general rule permitting in personam 
recovery against the minor would appear to underm ine the concern to 
protect minors. No doubt it is this consideration, in league with the 
implied contract theory, which has led the English courts to be — apart 
from the exceptions and inconsistencies canvassed above — generally 
unreceptive to these claims. Yet, the understandable impulse to afford 
in personam relief in some cases has produced doctrine which is, even 
for the law of restitution, remarkably unstable and capricious in its 
application. A much more satisafactory approach is indicated by those 
Canadian cases which suggest a jurisdiction to require the minor to make 
restitutio in integrum to the other party, provided that the jurisdiction, 
presumably equitable in nature, need not be exercised where it would
' “Supra, the text at footnote 47 rt. seq.
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be inequitable to do so.147 If the conceptualism of the earlier authorities 
can be set aside, it will be seen that the courts have been willing to impose 
a duty to restore upon a minor who seizes on his minority as an excuse 
for profiting at the expense of the other party, but will refuse to impose 
that duty, or will at least restrict the duty to one of restoring only 
benefits retained in specie, where the minor has lost or dissipated the 
benefit or where the other party is guilty o f oppressive conduct. It is 
submitted that these themes derived from the existing case law offer 
guidelines tor the exercise ot an equitable jurisdiction to require the minor 
to make a restitutio in integrum in appropriate cases.148 To put the point 
in modern dress, the duty ought not to be imposed in a particular case 
where the policy underlying the rules rendering the transaction unen­
forceable also requires denial of restitutionary relief. In such cases, it 
may be said, the enrichment of the minor is not unjust.
A more workable and just remedial mechanism for this area o f the 
law thus appears to be gradually evolving in the Canadian case law. The 
prospects for a thoughtful judicial rationalization of these rules ought not, 
however, be considered a basis for avoiding statutory reform of the law of 
minors’ contracts, though in the interim, it may facilitate a more even- 
handed and just disposition of individual cases. This would not be an 
insignificant achievement. The leisurely pace of reform in matters of 
private law suggests that the “interim” may be a very long time indeed.
MTThe Supreme Court o f  Canada has indicated the existence o f a discretion to excuse the party 
lacking contractual capacity from making full restitution in the analogous context of contracts unen­
forceable on grounds of menu! incompetency. See WUson v. The Kmg [1938] S.C.R. 317, [1938] 
3 D.L.R. 433. Clearly, recovery would not be allowed where the minor had, pursuant to the agree­
ment, rendered a benefit in return for the benefit received. See Toronto Marlboro Major Juruor “A" 
Hockey Club et al. v. ToneUt et aL (1977), 18 O R. (2d) 21, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 403 (H.C.) at 36-37 (O R ), 
418 (D.L.R.), per Lerner J. (hockey-playing contract held not beneficial to minor and therefore 
unenforceable; hockey club’s claim in quantum meruit for value o f training dismissed as the considerations 
were ‘‘mutual").
14*C/! the proposals of the Latey Committee, Cmnd. 3342, ss. 306-309, and of the Law Reform Com­
mission of British Columbia, in its Report on Minors' Contracts (1976), at 31-32.
